




World growth projected to be quite steady, at just over 3%

Real GDP growth

(percentage change)

		2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
World		-2.5	6.4	3.3	3.1	3.2	3.2
China		2.2	8.5	3.0	5.2	4.9	4.5
India	•	-5.9	9.4	6.5	8.2	6.7	6.8
US		-2.2	5.8	1.9	2.5	2.6	1.6
UK		-10.4	8.7	4.3	0.1	1.1	1.2
Japan		-4.1	2.6	1.0	1.7	-0.1	1.4

Global PMI







Global trade rebounded at the turn of the year, but forward-looking indicators have weakened again (with major uncertainty ahead)



Harris and Trump Embrace Tariffs, Though Their Approaches Differ

Both Democrats and Republicans are expressing support for tariffs to protect American industry, reversing decades of trade thinking in Washington.

Source: The New York Times, 28 August 2024

Harris vs Trump, and the foreign policy shake-up ahead

Source: The Lowy Institute, 29 August 2024


US Election a Top Global Risk But Tricky to Forecast, BofA Says



Source: Bloomberg, 5 September 2024

Euro area inflation: Team (long) Temporary for the win?

Inflation in the euro area





Percentage change, unless otherwise stated	2022	2023	2024e	2025e	2026e
Headline inflation	8.4	5.4	2.5	1.2	1.9
Core inflation	3.9	4.9	2.9	2.3	2.0



Eurosystem/ECB project a consumption-driven economic recovery ...

lower inflation + pent-up wage growth




Stronger consumption growth

= purchasing power boost

Euro area: % growth of real GDP and private consumption

(ECB September 2024 macroeconomic projections)







... but the euro area economic recovery has been announced a couple of times already

Forecast vintages for EA real GDP

(volume index, 2021Q1 = 100; Eurosystem and ECB projections)





How much of the slump is cyclical and how much is structural?






Short-term growth projected to be subdued and came in slightly below expectations in 2024Q2; however, still no recession on the horizon

Confidence indicators

(the most recent observation dates from September, responses have been standardised)¹




Producer confidence (gross)

Consumer confidence

Real GDP growth

(quarterly percentage change)




See the Business Cycle Monitor (9 September)



Sources: NAI, NBB.


¹ The balance of responses was standardised by subtracting the long-term average (since 1990) and dividing by the standard deviation.


June 2024 projections: GDP growth projected to decrease slightly given the moderation in domestic demand, with net exports recovering only gradually





Private consumption has decelerated and growth is expected to remain moderate, broadly in line with income growth








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Business investment growth has moderated and should remain muted

Business investment

(quarterly percentage change, in volume terms)



--- p.m. Average 2010-2019 • Latest statistics

NBB Business Echo National Ban



(29 May)


- + : Modernisation of existing production infrastructure
- : Worsening of competitiveness and tighter margins are weighing on new investment projects



Residential investment has declined and should recover only gradually


Investment in housing

(quarterly percentage change, in volume terms)



Number of building permits granted for homes

(number of homes in thousands)



Nieuwbouwwoningen op laagste peil in 25 jaar



Sources: De Tijd (2 October), Statbel, NAI, NBB.


-- p.m. Average 2010-2019 ◆ Latest statistics

¹ Data are available for the first half of 2024. We have multiplied the number of permits by two on this graph, to get an approximate guess of the annual figure.


Aside from the need for climate-related renovation investments, the number of homes should be increased to improve affordability

Repayment burden for a new mortgage for an average home¹

(percentage of net disposable income)



Number of households by type (in millions)







Sources: FPB, Statbel, NBB.

¹ This indicator is based on the assumption that a household with average disposable income purchases an average home and finances 80% of the purchase price with a 20-year fixed-rate mortgage. The tax deductibility of the mortgage, transaction costs and future changes in income are not taken into account.

Recovery of global trade and improved cost competitiveness: growth in Belgian exports set to accelerate gradually








Job creation mostly in line with (weak!) expectations and should pick up again as productivity growth normalises


Domestic job creation

(quarterly change in thousands of people)





Productivity per hour worked in the private sector



---- Average 2010-2022



Sources: NAI, NBB.

Employees

More people are working, but the share of non-market services in total employment has increased and the gap with the EA has not narrowed


Employment rate

(employed persons as a percentage of the working age population (aged 20 to 64))



Share of employment accounted for by non-market services

(percentage of total domestic employment)






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The rise in headline inflation in 2024 is attributable to energy prices (+ technical factor: ending of government support measures)

Headline inflation

(contribution to headline inflation in percentage points, unless otherwise stated)







Observations as of May until September 2024.

(Processed) food prices have not fallen sharply (↔ energy), which could explain the high "perceived inflation" (shopping basket effect)

Food prices: level



Food inflation



Processed food products


— Unprocessed food products




Sources: Statbel, NBB.

Wage growth ceiling: no collectively negotiated wage increases; the hourly wage-cost gap will largely disappear by 2026

Growth in hourly labour costs in the private sector¹ (percentages)





p.m. If the comparison starts in 2019 (pay gap \approx 0), the cumulative gap will still be 0.9% in 2026

Sources: Eurosystem, NAI, NBB.




¹ On the left-hand graph, hourly labour costs are presented in accordance with a broader definition than that used to compile the national accounts, one that includes wage subsidies and targeted reductions in social security contributions. On the right-hand graph, the national accounts concept is used to ensure comparability with the three neighbouring countries.

² Cumulative difference between the growth in BE hourly labour costs and the average for neighbouring countries over the years in question. This does not necessarily correspond to the official calculation of the wage gap by the CEC.

Corporate profit margins remain above their long-term average

Profit margin of non-financial corporations

(gross operating surplus as a percentage of value added)






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


URGENT: measures needed to reduce budget deficit and bring government debt back on a declining path

The budget deficit¹ will remain structurally (far too) high assuming no policy change (as a % of GDP)



The debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to rise (as a % of GDP)






Sources: Federal Planning Bureau, NAI, NBB.

These figures do not take into account the implicit deficit of 0.4% of GDP on average per year over 2021-2026 in order to finance debt in respect of subsidies granted to EU Member States under the NGEU programme.

Structural increase in current primary expenditure needs to be addressed






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Europe is losing more ground on the US

GDP per capita

(levels, in purchasing power standard)



QoQ real GDP growth

(chain linked volumes, percentage change on previous period, seasonally and calendar adjusted data)

	EA	US
2023Q1	0.0	0.7
2023Q2	0.1	0.6
2023Q3	0.0	1.1
2023Q4	0.1	0.8
2024Q1	0.3	0.4
2024Q2	0.2	≈ 0.7




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
Lower productivity growth, less dynamic corporate sector

Real labour productivity per hour worked

(index, 1995=100; nonfarm business sector for the US)



Stoxx Europe 600 vs S&P500 market capitalisation






Europe's/Belgium's problems increasingly come from the supply side

Job vacancy rate (seasonally adjusted, last observation: 2024Q2) 2015

Factors limiting the business in services

(in % of respondents, multiple replies possible)






2024 survey among Belgian firms confirms risk of delocalisation for manufacturing firms (in response to climate transition)

Expected relative energy prices in Belgium compared to the rest of the world in 2030

(% of respondents)



Manufacturing firms report on expectations by 2030 due to climate transition:

- Higher costs and sales prices
- Margin squeeze
- Negative impact on demand
- In net terms, less investment in Belgium ...
- ... but a clear tendency to increase investment outside the EU





Draghi report: problem acknowledged but solution multi-pronged?

Reform governance:

- improve the decision-making process (faster, simpler)
- reduce policy fragmentation (between countries, between levels of governance)
- reduce regulatory burden



Hanno Lustig • @HannoLu... · 24/09/2024 The best EU industrial policy would be for Brussels to get out the way.

















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